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Of Power and Process: Handling Harassers in an At-
Will World 
Rachel Arnow-Richman 
abstract.  In the wake of the #MeToo movement, companies have taken swi� and severe 
disciplinary action against alleged harassers, raising questions in some instances as to whether 
their responses were justified. This Essay argues that balancing the goals of the #MeToo move-
ment with principles of fairness to the accused demands attention to an overlooked aspect of the 
problem: the employment status of the alleged harasser. The background rule of employment at 
will, coupled with employer contracting practices and the law of sexual harassment itself, produces 
a world in which employers are inclined to tolerate sexual harassment and other misconduct by 
top-level employees, but aggressively police “inappropriate” behavior by the rank-and-file. This 
Essay concludes that changing this calculus will require abandoning long-standing contracting 
practices that protect top-level employees and adopting collective bargaining-style protocols for 
dealing with vulnerable workers accused of harassment. 
introduction  
In November 2017, in the wake of the Harvey Weinstein scandal, Minnesota 
Public Radio (MPR) announced that it was severing ties with radio personality 
Garrison Keillor based on “allegations of his inappropriate behavior.”1 Accord-
ing to Keillor, he inadvertently placed a hand on an employee’s bare back while 
 
1. Angie Andresen, Statement from Minnesota Public Radio Regarding Garrison Keillor and a Prairie 
Home Companion, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.mpr.org/stories/2017
/11/29/statement-from-minnesota-public-radio-regarding-garrison-keillor-and-a-prairie 
-home-compa [https://perma.cc/76AH-UYCB]. 
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trying to console her.2 Public indignation at the firing followed. Within days, 
MPR had received thousands of comments from the entertainer’s fan base ob-
jecting to its decision.3 MPR, according to listeners, had come down too hard 
for too little. 
As with so many of the stories born of the #MeToo movement, however, 
more was to come. Subsequent press coverage revealed an eleven-year history of 
questionable behavior, including sexual remarks, alleged age and gender dis-
crimination, and an offer of a confidential settlement following a soured rela-
tionship with a subordinate.4 Such revelations, like the even more egregious ex-
amples exposed over the six months that followed, land a one-two punch: as 
shocking as the behavior is the fact that it was tolerated for so long. 
It is too soon to predict the legacy of the #MeToo movement, but the story 
of Keillor’s fall suggests two very different possibilities. It confirms what appears 
to be the dominant response: public opinion has overwhelmingly supported vic-
tims and condemned perpetrators. Onlookers are by now familiar with the re-
curring media cycle in which a single accusation of “sexual misconduct” against 
a well-known figure spurs initial denial and outrage, only to be followed by a 
larger media reveal. 
But there is also an undercurrent of concern. Some commentators have ques-
tioned whether accused harassers are receiving “due process” and expressed fear 
that trivial or benign sexualized behavior will get swept up in the mix.5 Employ-
ers may feel they have little choice in handling employee complaints. With har-
assment in the spotlight, many are likely to conclude that a swi� and severe re-
sponse to any allegation of misconduct is the only way to avoid a public relations 
nightmare.6 
 
2. Laura Yuen et al., Investigation: For Some Who Lived in It, Keillor’s World Wasn’t Funny, MPR 
NEWS (Jan. 23, 2018, 5:25 PM), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2018/01/23/keillor 
-workplace [https://perma.cc/QY7K-UK77]. 
3. Garrison Keillor, Garrison’s Response to Jon McTaggrt’s Letter of Jan. 23, 2018, GARRISON KEIL-
LOR (Feb. 4, 2018), http://www.garrisonkeillor.com/writing [https://perma.cc/5PKD-
KWVM]; Yuen et al., supra note 2. 
4. Yuen et al., supra note 2. 
5. Valeriya Safronova, Catherine Deneuve and Others Denounce the #MeToo Movement, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 9, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/09/movies/catherine-deneuve-and 
-others-denounce-the-metoo-movement.html [https://perma.cc/WP4F-PCF2]; Shira A. 
Scheindlin & Joel Cohen, A�er #MeToo, We Can’t Decide to Ditch Due Process, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
8, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/08/metoo-due 
-process-televictions [https://perma.cc/WB7M-DHMR]. 
6. Elizabeth Chuck, Accusations in the #MeToo Era: How Companies Handle Complaints, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2017, 8:27 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct 
/accusations-metoo-era-how-companies-handle-complaints-n829326 [https://perma.cc 
/MP8A-CTV8]. 
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This Essay argues that balancing the goals of the #MeToo movement with 
principles of fairness demands attention to an overlooked aspect of the problem: 
the employment status of the accused. The background rule of employment at 
will, coupled with employer-contracting practices and the law of sexual harass-
ment itself, produces a world in which employers are inclined to tolerate sexual 
harassment and other misconduct by top-level employees but aggressively police 
“inappropriate” behavior by the rank-and-file. While the former have the market 
power to negotiate job security and other contractual protections, the latter are 
almost invariably at-will employees who have no legal recourse against job loss 
or disproportionate discipline. Faced not only with the risk of sexual-harassment 
liability, but now with potential damage to their image and brand, companies 
have little to lose in taking a hard line against the most vulnerable workers. 
In sum, both #MeToo reformers and the movement’s skeptics are correct: 
when it comes to accusations of sexual harassment, we need greater institutional 
accountability for the conduct of those at the top of the workplace hierarchy, 
alongside greater protection for the rank-and-file. This Essay considers why that 
is and how it might be achieved. 
Part I explains how the dominant account of sexual harassment ignores the 
roles of gender and power—oversights that pave the way for a misdirected cor-
porate response that indiscriminately targets sexualized behavior rather than 
sex-based harassment. Part II uncovers how background law and private order-
ing by employers enable recurring sexual harassment by high-level actors but 
leave ordinary workers vulnerable to disproportionate discipline. Part III offers 
preliminary suggestions for an appropriate organizational approach to handling 
accusations of harassment. Companies must put a firm stop to exploitive sex-
based behavior while taking a nuanced approach to sexualized behavior gener-
ally. This requires abandoning long-standing contracting practices that protect 
top-level employees and adopting collective-bargaining-style protocols for deal-
ing with vulnerable workers accused of harassment. 
i .  sexual harassment as an extension of employer power  
Determining how to appropriately handle accusations of sexual harassment 
requires an understanding of the underlying wrong. The #MeToo movement, 
like the discussion of sexual harassment historically, has focused almost exclu-
sively on unwanted sexualized behavior.7 This both misunderstands the harm of 
sexual harassment and overlooks its context. Sexual harassment is an expression 
of gender discrimination enabled by workplace power dynamics—dynamics that 
 
7. Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, Again, 128 YALE L.J.F. 22, 33-34 (2018) 
[hereina�er Schultz, Reconceptualizing Again]. 
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derive in part from the absence of legal protection for vulnerable workers. The 
top dogs of the work world are uniquely positioned to perpetrate harassment, 
while the workers below them face the risk of ill-founded accusations of harass-
ment and are defenseless against any employer response. 
In her seminal work, Professor Vicki Schultz argues that sexual harassment 
has become unmoored from gender-equality principles.8 She reminds us that 
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination: its purpose and effect is to call 
attention to women’s differences, implicitly undermining their capacity as work-
ers while asserting and preserving male privilege and status.9 Sexual harassment 
may express itself in sexualized language or behavior or it may take the form of 
nonsexualized hostility toward workers of either sex who fail to conform to pre-
scribed gender norms.10 This makes sexual desire a poor proxy for the problem. 
Efforts to eliminate workplace sexuality are underinclusive because they fail to 
capture nonsexualized forms of sexual harassment.11 They are also likely to be 
overinclusive in that they fail to distinguish between discriminatory and innoc-
uous—sometimes, even welcome—sexualized behavior.12 
Schultz’s classic account of what is wrong with standard sexual harassment 
discourse is correct. But, as she acknowledges in her contribution to this Collec-
tion, it is also incomplete.13 The popular conception of sexual harassment not 
only ignores discrimination as a central element of sexual harassment, it also dis-
regards the inherent power dynamics of the typical employment environment. 
To be sure, the composition and structure of many workplaces reflect long-
standing discrimination—as the #MeToo movement lays bare, the highest 
ranked positions in many industries are held by men who assert power in dis-
criminatory ways, whether through sexualized or other forms of harassment, 
against women in subordinate positions.14 But the ability to mistreat workers of 
 
8. See Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683 (1998) [hereina�er 
Schultz, Reconceptualizing]; Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) 
[hereina�er Schultz, Sanitized Workplace]. 
9. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8, at 1699-1702; Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 
8, at 2079-87. 
10. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8, at 1756-61, 1774-89; Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, su-
pra note 8, at 2065-66. For an excellent account of how gender norm conformity undergirds 
sexual harassment, see Brian Soucek, Queering Sexual Harassment Law, 128 YALE L.J.F. 67, 73-
76(2018) (using narrative and queer theory to juxtapose desire-based and gender-based har-
assment in the context of sexual harassment of a lesbian firefighter). 
11. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8, at 1729-33. 
12. Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 2082-87. 
13. Schultz, Reconceptualizing Again, supra note 7, at 52-53. 
14. Id. 
 
of power and process 
89 
either sex by any means is a consequence of the general allocation of workplace 
rights—an allocation that derives from employment at will. 
American law presumes that both the employer and the employee are free to 
terminate their relationship at any time for any reason or no reason at all.15 This 
default rule, combined with the absence of robust public regulation of workplace 
relationships, means that terms of employment are determined almost entirely 
by private ordering.16 Consequently, most workers, other than those at the very 
top of the workplace hierarchy, have no right to their job, nor any voice in dic-
tating the conditions of their employment.17 They are vulnerable not only to 
harassment, but also to loss of work, demotions, relocations, transfers, pay cuts, 
reductions in hours, mandatory overtime, oppressive schedules—the full range 
of adverse changes to their working lives and job conditions.18 In contrast, top-
level employees are able to exert superior market power to obtain job security as 
well as binding and desirable employment terms. The resulting power disparity 
means that the highest-level workers are free to impose outrageous demands on 
subordinate employees, subject them to verbal abuse, threaten their livelihoods, 
disrupt their career trajectories—in short, to create a hostile work environment. 
Antidiscrimination law, in theory, constrains private ordering by offering 
victims a cause of action for sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retalia-
tion. However, the prospect of a lawsuit historically has not been enough to alter 
 
15. For a discussion of employment at will, its scope, and its history, see Rachel Arnow-Richman, 
Mainstreaming Employment Contract Law: The Common Law Case for Reasonable Notice of Ter-
mination, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1513, 1530-45 (2014); Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-
will Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. 
L. REV. 453, 460-66 (2008); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 
20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120 (1976).  
16. For a general discussion of the concept of private ordering and its various forms, see Ste-
ven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 319, 324-29 (2002) (describing a rule-
making spectrum with soveriegn control at one end and unregulated private action at the 
other). 
17. Cynthia Estlund, Truth, Lies, and Power at Work, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 349, 360 
(2017) (noting that “both exit and voice are costly and constrained for workers,” resulting in 
employers maintaining significant power over employees). 
18. See generally ELIZABETH ANDERSON, PRIVATE GOVERNMENT: HOW EMPLOYERS RULE OUR 
LIVES 37-41 (2017) (analogizing the at-will workplace to a communist dictatorship); Nantiya 
Ruan, Corporate Masters & Low-Wage Servants: The Social Control of Workers in Poverty, 24 
WASH. & LEE J. CIV. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 103, 136-47 (2017) (describing the precariousness of 
low-wage work and employees’ vulnerability to objectionable working conditions). Employ-
ers can leverage all of these pressure points not only in perpetrating harassment, but also in 
retaliating against those who complain. See Nicole Porter, The Perils of Reporting Harassment, 
71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 49, 50 (2018) (citing “discipline, negative evaluations, department 
or shi� changes, demotion [and] increased surveillance” as instruments of retaliation). 
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the pre-existing dynamics that have le� high-level harassment underreported 
and the laws against it underenforced.19 The #MeToo movement appears to 
have tipped the balance, but thus far only in a subset of cases involving exclu-
sively sexualized behavior. Employers who respond to the #MeToo movement 
by looking solely at unwanted sexualized behavior are likely to miss the forest 
while uprooting particular trees. By contrast, examining the allocation of power 
in contemporary workplaces helps identify where and in what form sexual har-
assment is likely to occur.20 Not only are top-level employees uniquely situated 
to sexually harass their subordinates, their disproportionate influence and con-
trol makes any form of harassment, or any implicit threat of adverse conse-
quences, more menacing. 
Reports from judicial clerks of former Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski 
epitomize this dynamic. Absent context, the judge’s alleged conduct—the occa-
sional sexualized comment, display of pornography, or off-color joke over a pe-
riod of thirty years—while inappropriate, would not likely be deemed severe or 
pervasive conduct actionable under antidiscrimination law.21 But the alleged 
events occurred in a relationship of the most extreme power imbalance, one in 
 
19. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 351 (“Although retaliation against employees who assert their 
rights at work is usually unlawful, the law is far from swi� or sure in its response.”); Porter, 
supra note 18, at 50 (“[R]eporting harassment is fraught with risk, and o�en brings very little 
reward.”). 
20. To be clear, this is not a causal argument. My claim is not that workplace power allocations 
are determinative of sexual harassment, but rather that attention to the inherent dynamics of 
at-will relationships reveals more subtle forms of sexual harassment, including non-sexual-
ized harassment and sexualized behavior that might not otherwise be perceived as severe or 
pervasive. For a nuanced examination of the role of power and other causal factors in produc-
ing harassment, including a review of the sociological literature, see Joanna L. Grossman, The 
Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Substance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 
HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 35-37 (2003). 
21. See Matt Zapotosky, Prominent Appeals Court Judge Alex Kozinski Accused of Sexual Misconduct, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security
/prominent-appeals-court-judge-alex-kozinski-accused-of-sexual-misconduct/2017/12/08/1
763e2b8-d913-11e7-a841-2066faf731ef_story.html [https://perma.cc/5CCT-7G94]. To be ac-
tionable, discriminatory harassment must be severe or pervasive. See generally Harris v. Fork-
li� Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (clarifying the standard for actionable sexual harassment 
under Title VII); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (recognizing sexual 
harassment as actionable sex discrimination where sufficiently extreme to affect terms and 
conditions of employment). Courts generally do not deem verbal statements severe, and the 
isolated nature of the judge’s statements, which occurred from time to time over a period of 
years and were directed toward different clerks, would make it difficult for any one plaintiff 
to establish pervasiveness. See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMER-
ICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 32-40 (2017) (critiquing these and related 
judicial interpretations of the sexual harassment standard for barring recovery to a dispropor-
tionate number of victims). 
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which recent entrees to the legal profession work in isolation for a revered judge 
with a lifetime appointment to one of the most respected federal appeals courts 
in the country. They also unfolded in an environment where power was allegedly 
exploited in other nonsexualized ways—the judge calling his clerks “slaves,” in-
sisting on their absolute loyalty, and asserting total control over their lives and 
schedules.22 Such context colors the allegations to chilling effect and clarifies the 
appropriate inquiry. The question should not be whether the individual sexual-
ized references were pervasive in and of themselves, but whether the entire cli-
mate created by the judge’s behavior constituted a hostile environment for fe-
male clerks based on their sex.23 
This description of workplace power dynamics may justify an aggressive re-
sponse to allegations of sexual harassment against the type of high-level employ-
ees who have come under the #MeToo spotlight. But the power dynamics play 
out differently in cases of harassment allegations leveled against lower-status 
employees. Isolated sexualized comments or actions by these workers, particu-
larly those lacking supervisory authority, are comparatively less likely to create a 
toxic work environment because they are not accompanied by an implicit threat 
to impose work-related consequences on the victim. For the same reason, such 
rank-and-file workers are also less capable of leveraging workplace power dy-
namics to perpetrate nonsexualized gender-based harassment.24 
Most critically, these workers share with their accusers a vulnerability to in-
discriminate adverse action by those above them in the workplace hierarchy. The 
very dynamics that make workers susceptible to sexual harassment in the first 
place put them at risk of excessive disciplinary action in the face of sexual har-
assment allegations. Employers’ absolute power, combined with their conflation 
of sex and sexual harassment, mean that in the #MeToo-inspired race to root 
 
22. Editorial, #MeToo Makes Its Way to the Judiciary, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2017), https://www
.washingtonpost.com/opinions/metoo-makes-it-way-to-the-judiciary/2017/12/23/488946d4
-e5d5-11e7-ab50-621fe0588340_story.html [https://perma.cc/4XF5-6D2L]. 
23. To be sure, one might worry about the ability of those in power to engage in such behavior 
vis-à-vis all workers, but such “equal opportunity harassment” is not proscribed by antidis-
crimination law; indeed, it is protected by employment at will. For a discussion of the problem 
of generalized, non-discriminatory workplace bullying, the law’s limitations in redressing it, 
and possible legislative solutions, see David Yamada, Cra�ing a Legislative Response to Work-
place Bullying, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL. J. 475 (2004). 
24. That is not to say that supervisors are the only employees capable of creating a hostile work 
environment. Indeed, some studies suggest that co-worker harassment is more common than 
supervisory harassment. See Grossman, supra note 20, at 35-36 (reviewing the literature on 
this point). The point is that the victim’s experience of sexualized behavior as hostile will be 
influenced by the status of the perpetrator. For an example of egregious sexual harassment 
perpetrated by male subordinates against their female supervisor, see Soucek, supra note 10, 
at 70-73. 
the yale law journal forum June 18, 2018 
92 
out inappropriate sexualized behavior, workers with less power, engaged in less 
pernicious behavior, are likely to be swept up in the rush to judgment. 
i i .  law, private ordering, and the construction of 
workplace power  
The above account of the baseline power allocations in the workplace illus-
trates the harm of harassment and its relationship to workplace hierarchy. But 
there is more to the story. Private ordering by employers, in response to the law 
and in furtherance of their business interests, exacerbates these pre-existing im-
balances. Their choices directly affect whether an accused harasser is likely to 
receive fair treatment. 
A. Contractual Protection for the Top Dogs 
Top-level employees enjoy terms of employment far more favorable than 
those afforded to everyone else. In addition to generous compensation and ben-
efits, these individuals o�en negotiate job-security rights that constrain employ-
ers’ ability to terminate or discipline them even in situations involving alleged 
sexual harassment. 
The terms of chief executive contracts provide a striking example. A 2006 
study examining the contracts of 375 CEOs revealed that the overwhelming ma-
jority of agreements protect against arbitrary termination, either in the form of 
a guaranteed term of employment (“fixed-term” contracts), the right to lucrative 
payouts in the event of termination without cause, or a combination of the two.25 
Most importantly, these agreements significantly limit employers’ ability to act 
for “cause” by providing narrow, exclusive definitions of the term. Legitimate 
grounds for terminating executives are commonly restricted to instances of will-
ful misconduct, moral turpitude, or failure to perform duties,26 categories un-
derstood to permit termination only in extreme situations. 27 Egregious harass-
ment could fall within some of these categories, but lesser misconduct, like that 
 
25. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Contracts: 
What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 247 (2006). 
26. Id. at 233. Even in situations where a fixed-term contract does not expressly enumerate 
grounds, courts generally apply a narrower definition of just cause than that applied to indef-
inite agreements, requiring employers to show a material breach by the employee as opposed 
to any business justification. See RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. b (AM. LAW. 
INST. 2015). 
27. Executive employee exit is almost always a negotiated affair, resulting in a dearth of relevant 
caselaw. Those decisions that exist offer minimal protection and few answers to employers 
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alleged against Judge Kozinski, likely would not. Only two contracts in the re-
search sample explicitly permitted termination for sexual harassment.28 In short, 
adverse employer action taken in response to allegations of sexual harassment 
could, in many cases, subject companies to contractual liability. 
The risk of liability is heightened by the employee-friendly standards of 
proof that o�en apply to written-contract disputes. In cases involving employees 
who lack power to obtain an individualized written contract, but who nonethe-
less can establish implied rights to long-term employment, the burden is on the 
employee to show that the employer’s rationale was inadequate or pretextual.29 
Courts give employers wide latitude in justifying termination decisions. It is of-
ten enough that the decision-maker reasonably and in good faith believed it had 
cause to remove the employee, even if in retrospect its decision proves incor-
rect.30 In contrast, where an employee is protected by a fixed-term contract, the 
employer must be able to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the underlying misconduct occurred.31 In other words, if employers wish to 
cleanly remove high-level employees based on sexual harassment, they better be 
right about what happened. 
Employers must also attend to all procedural requirements set forth in the 
parties’ agreement. Balles v. Babcock Power, Inc., a recent case involving a breach 
of contract action by a former executive, offers a cautionary tale about the risks 
of improvident termination.32 The plaintiff, Balles, began an affair with an in-
tern under his supervision, which, while apparently consensual, violated numer-
ous company policies.33 Owing to his influence, the company hired her, and over 
 
navigating their legal rights in the face of high-level harassment. See Balles v. Babcock Power 
Inc., 70 N.E.3d 905, 916 (Mass. 2016) (holding an employer liable for breach of an executive’s 
stock contract despite the executive’s sexual misconduct where the company failed to provide 
notice and an opportunity for the executive to cure his behavior); Prozinski v. Ne. Real Estate 
Serv., 797 N.E.2d 415, 423-24 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003) (ruling that a question of fact existed as 
to whether an executive’s pattern of harassing behavior against multiple women, combined 
with financial mismanagement, constituted material breach justifying the company’s refusal 
to pay severance upon termination). 
28. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 25. 
29. See, e.g., Pugh v. See’s Candies, 116 Cal. App. 3d 311,329 (1981). 
30. See, e.g., Cotran v. Rollins Hudig Hall Int’l, Inc., 948 P.2d 412, 423 (Cal. 1998) (finding that 
the jury should consider not whether Cotran actually sexually harassed other employees, but 
whether, at the time of termination, the decision to terminate his employment was made in 
good faith by the defendants). 
31. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.04 cmt. d (AM. LAW. INST. 2015). 
32. Balles, 70 N.E.3d at 907. 
33. Id. at 909. 
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the course of their relationship, Balles, while continuing to serve as her supervi-
sor, promoted and awarded her raises, traveled with her on company-funded 
trips, and sent her sexually explicit messages and photos through company de-
vices.34 
Upon discovering the relationship, the company terminated Balles, refused 
to pay him severance, and exercised an adverse provision in his stock agree-
ment.35 Balles sued and won, successfully arguing that his behavior did not con-
stitute cause permitting the employer to buy back his shares in the company.36 
His stock agreement allowed the employer to exercise its rights upon 
“fraud, . . . gross insubordination . . . [or] willful and material breach . . . not 
corrected within thirty” days.37 The court read the first two grounds narrowly, 
rejecting arguments that Balles’s flouting of company policy and efforts to cover 
up his affair constituted either fraud or insubordination.38 More revealingly, it 
dismissed the theory that Balles’s conduct might have constituted a material 
breach, owing to the company’s failure to provide the requisite notice and op-
portunity to cure.39 In so doing, it rejected the employer’s argument that Balles’s 
abuse of power and the harm he had caused could not be undone.40 In effect, the 
court held that the executive was contractually entitled to one free bite at the 
apple.41 
Balles illustrates why employers are inclined to be cautious in responding to 
allegations of harassment perpetrated by high-level employees. Not only are 
these individuals “just cause” employees, their contracts typically qualify that 
term to preclude termination for some behavior that would ordinarily appear to 
constitute cause—including inappropriate sexual behavior. Yet the #MeToo 
movement has revealed a further twist: media sources report that Harvey Wein-
stein’s contract not only limited permissible causes for termination to conviction 
of a crime or fraud, an exceedingly narrow definition even by executive-contract 
standards, but actually contemplated and permitted misconduct toward other 
 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 909-10. 
36. Id. at 918. In contrast to the stock agreement, the employment agreement did not limit the 
grounds for termination, and consequently the trial court’s finding that the company was not 
obligated to pay Balles severance under that agreement was not appealed. Id. at 910. 
37. Id. at 908. The agreement also permitted termination in two other cases—commission of a 
felony or willful failure to perform—which the employer did not invoke in its defense. 
38. Id. at 913-14. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 916. 
41. The plaintiff was ultimately awarded his stock less a withholding for the company’s successful 
counterclaim for breach of fiduciary duty, a claim not dependent on any contract. Id. 
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employees. If Weinstein “treated someone improperly in violation of the com-
pany’s Code of Conduct,” the contract required him to reimburse the company 
for any resulting settlements or judgments and pay a graduated penalty of be-
tween $250,000 and one million dollars depending on the number of prior vio-
lations.42 Thus, the contract not only created a safe harbor for Weinstein’s sexual 
misconduct, it anticipated and condoned an ongoing pattern of misbehavior, as 
long as Weinstein was willing to pay for the privilege. 
One can hope that contracts like Weinstein’s are a rarity. But they demon-
strate the lengths to which companies will go to reward and protect the top dogs 
of their industry. It is one of the great achievements of the #MeToo movement 
that the prospect of public censure is changing the calculus for employers re-
garding sexual harassment allegations against high-level executives. At least in 
some cases, taking action against harassers has become worth the financial and 
legal risk. But those risks remain substantial. The value of the lost dividends 
alone owed to the plaintiff in Balles was over $900,000, far in excess of the dam-
ages cap on sexual harassment claims.43 In such situations, employers have more 
to lose in terminating the accused than in paying out on a claim for sexual har-
assment. Given how the deck is stacked, there is little reason to fear that employ-
ers will respond too harshly or act without evidence against high-level harassers. 
B. Employment at Will and the Powerless Harasser 
When the conduct of an ordinary employee is in question, however, em-
ployer incentives cut the opposite way. To be sure, lower-level employees, even 
those without supervisory authority, are capable of producing a hostile work en-
vironment, but such employees lack power vis-à-vis their employer.44 If an ac-
cused harasser is employed at will, companies have little to lose by terminating 
 
42. Harvey Weinstein Contract with TWC Allowed for Sexual Harassment, TMZ (Oct. 12, 2017), 
http://www.tmz.com/2017/10/12/weinstein-contract-the-weinstein-company-sexual 
-harassment-firing-illegal [https://perma.cc/FH6U-ZVHH]. Media sources suggest that Fox 
News political commentator Bill O’Reilly was similarly insulated against repercussions for 
sexual harassment by a provision prohibiting termination for allegations of misconduct ab-
sent proof in court. Testimony: Bill O’Reilly Had a Contractual Provision Virtually Allowing Sex-
ual Harassment, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik 
-wemple/wp/2017/11/08/testimony-bill-oreilly-had-a-contractual-provision-virtually- 
allowing-sexual-harassment/?utm_term=.241d6e03ac54 [https://perma.cc/R2MN-R86T]. 
43. Balles v. Babcock Power, Inc., No. MICV201004806, 2014 WL 10337843, at *6 (Mass. Super. 
Ct. 2014). Title VII caps compensatory and punitive damages at $300,000 for employers with 
500 employees or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D) (2012). 
44. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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that individual, and every incentive to hedge against the risk of sexual harass-
ment liability. 
Weighing against accused harassers in this calculus is the law of sexual har-
assment itself, which places a premium on swi� and decisive employer re-
sponses. The 1998 Supreme Court decisions in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth and Farragher v. Boca Raton provide employers with an affirmative defense 
to vicarious liability for hostile work environment harassment perpetrated by a 
supervisor.45 To assert this defense, the employer must show that it “exercised 
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior” 
and that the victim failed to take advantage of opportunities to avoid or end the 
harm.46 Scholars have criticized this defense as spawning human resource train-
ings and superficial policies that courts accept as evidence of preventive action 
but that are in fact largely ineffective in reducing sexual harassment.47 
While most preventive action as currently implemented may be unhelpful to 
victims, the corrective action element is objectionable in a different way: 
Ellerth/Farragher-inspired corrective action can be excessively harmful to the ac-
cused. Corrective action generally involves investigating and redressing any re-
port of objectionable behavior. Terminating an accused harasser is a surefire way 
of satisfying this element of the defense, even if the reported behavior might 
merit lesser discipline. In cases of uncertainty, as when the employer is unable to 
verify whether harassing conduct occurred, it is safer for employers to err on the 
side of punishing the accused. Even if the employer is mistaken, its actions are 
presumptively protected by the employment-at-will rule, whereas insufficient 
 
45. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 
(1998). 
46. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. In cases of coworker harassment, a negligence 
standard applies with the assessment o�en turning on similar considerations. See Vance v. Ball 
State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2452 (2013) (noting that where harassment is commited by a non-
supervisor, a plaintiff can “prevail by showing [the] employer was negligent in failing to pre-
vent harassment” and explaining that “[e]vidence that an employer did not monitor the work-
place, failed to respond to complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints, 
or effectively discouraged complaints from being filed would be relevant”); Ellerth, 524 U.S. 
at 759 (“An employer is negligent with respect to sexual harassment if it knew or should have 
known about the conduct and failed to stop it.”). 
47. See, e.g., Susan Bisom-Rapp, Sex Harassment Training Must Change: The Case for Legal Incen-
tives for Transformative Education and Prevention, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 62, 67-68, 70-71 
(2018); Joanna L. Grossman, The Culture of Compliance: The Final Triumph of Form Over Sub-
stance in Sexual Harassment Law, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 3 (2003); Anne Lawton, Operating 
in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & 
L. 197 (2004). 
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responsive action in the face of credible allegations of harassment creates the risk 
of statutory liability.48 
In this context, public calls for due process for accused harassers are ironic. 
There is no requirement of internal due process in an at-will workplace. If em-
ployers need no reason to terminate an employee, they need not verify the truth 
of the accusations underlying their decision, provide opportunities for the 
worker to be heard, or vet the proportionality of their response. In fact, harassers 
arguably get more due process than at-will employees who engage in any other 
form of misconduct, owing to their employers’ efforts to protect themselves 
from victims’ lawsuits. It is only because employers investigate allegations of 
harassment to avoid potential liability to the victim that those accused enjoy any 
form of process at all. 
This legal landscape, combined with confusion over the underlying harm of 
sexual harassment, invites employers to enforce a broad, antisexual norm against 
vulnerable workers.49 My review of recent labor arbitration awards in union 
grievances bears this out. Labor awards are among the only available sources of 
adjudication of employer termination and discipline for employee misconduct, 
including sexual misconduct. Unionized employees, unlike most rank-and-file 
workers, are contractually entitled to job security and progressive discipline, a 
system of gradually escalating penalties for repeated infractions.50 Those subject 
to adverse treatment may challenge their employer’s decision through a formal 
grievance process culminating in arbitration, in which the burden of proof falls 
to the employer to establish just cause.51 
During the five-year period from January 1, 2013 through January 1, 2018, 
there were sixty-four reported labor arbitration awards involving discipline or 
termination based at least in part on alleged sexual harassment, inappropriate 
 
48. Elizabeth Chuck, Accusations in the #MeToo Era: How Companies Handle Complaints, NBC 
NEWS (Dec. 17, 2017), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/accusations-
metoo-era-how-companies-handle-complaints-n829326 [https://perma.cc/2KCZ-64ER]; 
Dana Wilkie, A Rush to Judgment? Are Companies and Politicians Reacting Too Quickly to Sexual 
Harassment Allegations?, SOC. FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.shrm
.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/employee-relations/pages/sexual.aspx  [https://perma.cc
/F2CC-NPST]. 
49. Schultz’s work is replete with examples. See Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 
2087-90. 
50. For a general explanation of the concepts of just cause and progressive discipline in the un-
ionized workplace, including sample clauses and their prevalence, see BLOOMBERG BNA LA-
BOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION 228-30 (2d ed. 1995); BLOOMBERG BNA, 
BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS 7 (14th ed. 1995). 
51. BLOOMBERG BNA, FAIRWEATHER’S PRACTICE PROCEDURE LABOR ARBITRATION § 10.II, at 273-
75 (4th ed. 2018). 
 
the yale law journal forum June 18, 2018 
98 
sexual behavior, sexual language or innuendo, bodily exposure, or sexually ex-
plicit material.52 In twenty-eight of the awards, the grievant prevailed, meaning 
the grievant obtained either a reversal or reduction in the employer’s punish-
ment. Thus, in nearly forty-five percent of awards, the arbitrator concluded that 
the employer had gone too far or acted without sufficient justification or pro-
cess.53 
Several of these reversals exemplify the tendency of employers to engage in 
overzealous disciplinary action in response to behavior that relates to or invokes 
sex or sexuality, regardless of context. In one award, the grievant was a female 
distribution-center employee for a national retailer who was involved in a con-
sensual domestic partnership with another female employee.54 Privately, the 
couple argued at work about the grievant’s alleged romantic interest in another 
coworker, during which the grievant made a sexual comment about the 
coworker.55 The suspicious partner subsequently confronted the coworker and 
told her about the grievant’s comment.56 The shocked coworker stated that she 
was straight and asked to be le� out of the couple’s problems.57 An HR investi-
gation ensued, and the employer terminated both the grievant and her partner 
for violating the company’s harassment policy.58 
In another example, a male grievant, a supermarket meat cutter, was termi-
nated for mooning his male coworker.59 The two were engaged in horseplay in 
a nonpublic area of the store when the coworker dared the grievant to drop his 
 
52. This sample was obtained by reviewing all reported awards in Bloomberg BNA’s Labor Arbi-
tration Awards database during the relevant time period containing the term “sexual harass-
ment.” This yielded a body of 207 awards, of which sixty-five unique decisions were deter-
mined to be relevant. 
53. Similar studies, conducted in 1999 and 2004, found grievances sustained at rates closer to fi�y 
percent. Estelle D. Franklin, Maneuvering Through the Labyrinth: The Employers’ Paradox in 
Responding to Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment—A Proposed Way Out, 67 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1517 (1998-1999); Margaret A. Lucero et al., Protecting the Rights of Alleged Sexual Har-
assment Perpetrators: Guidance from the Decisions of Labor Arbitrators, 16 EMP. RTS. & RESP. J. 71 
(2004).  
54. Rite Aid of W. Va., Inc. v. Teamsters Local 175, 138 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 225, 226 (2017) 
(Wilson, Arb.). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local v. Emp’r, 2016 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) Supp. 
200612 (2016) (Altman, Arb.). 
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pants. The grievant briefly obliged and the coworker, without the grievant’s per-
mission, snapped a photo.60 Upon the grievant’s objection, the coworker pur-
ported to delete the photo, but many months later, he showed it to another male 
employee who reported it to management. According to the grievant, the co-
worker displayed the photo to retaliate against him for reporting the coworker 
for taking excessive breaks.61 The employer investigated and terminated both 
employees. Defending its decision in the arbitration that followed, the employer 
likened the conduct to two instances of unwelcome male-on-female genital ex-
posure that had led to termination.62 
Examples like these suggest that the risk of disproportionate discipline 
against rank-and-file workers is real. Neither award involved an abuse of power; 
both involved actions by coworkers who were not in a supervisory relationship. 
In neither case did the objectionable conduct reflect hostility toward or disparate 
treatment of the “victim” based on sex. The employee who reported the photo 
in the horseplay case stated he did not find it offensive.63 The comment in the 
warehouse case was the product of a domestic argument and was not based on 
sex discrimination. 
If anything, the terminations appear to have endorsed rather than penalized 
opportunistic, possibly even discriminatory, behavior. The fact that the com-
ment in the warehouse was made by a lesbian woman referencing lesbian sex 
may have contributed to the straight worker’s reaction, heightening its perceived 
offensiveness.64 In the horseplay case, the photo-snapping coworker turned an 
inoffensive, if inappropriate, jest between workplace friends into a sanctionable 
act of public exposure, allegedly to get even with the grievant in a petty dispute. 
Most disturbing of all is that these terminations happened prior to #MeToo 
in unionized workplaces where employers are accountable for their personnel 
decisions. Employers enjoying the freedom of an at-will workplace, responding 
to the public pressures of the movement, are likely to act even more aggressively 
in disciplining sexualized conduct. 
 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. The just cause standard applicable in grievance proceedings requires the employer to 
prove, among other things, that the grievant received “equal treatment” vis-a-vis others who 
committed similar offenses in the past. See BLOOMBERG BNA, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 
vii-viii (3d ed. 2006) [hereina�er SEVEN TESTS]; see also infra note 69 and accompanying text. 
63. Id. Under Meritor, sexual harassment, to be actionable, must be “unwelcome,” or in the 
Court’s subsequent articulation of the claim, it should be subjectively offensive to the victim. 
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Harris v. Forkli� Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 
22 (1993). 
64. See Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 2158-63 (suggesting allegations of harass-
ment are more likely to be leveled at sexual minorities and nonwhite workers). 
the yale law journal forum June 18, 2018 
100 
i i i .  fair terms, fair process: accountability despite 
private ordering 
How should employers handle sexual harassment accusations? This Essay 
has suggested that the risks of disproportionate employer responses to harass-
ment allegations cut in different directions depending on the employment status 
of the accused. A reallocation of workplace power would, of course, do much to 
remedy the situation. If workers had greater job security and greater voice in 
determining their working conditions, they would be less vulnerable both to 
workplace harassment and to overzealous discipline following harassment alle-
gations. It would also be more difficult for employers to terminate them, mar-
ginalize them, or purchase their silence in an effort to retain and protect high-
level harassers.65 
Of course, imaging a fundamental restructuring of the workplace and em-
ployment at will is beyond the scope of this Essay. Terms and duration of em-
ployment are, and for the foreseeable future will continue to be, the province of 
private ordering. Fortunately, the outpouring of support for the #MeToo move-
ment and the responsive action taken thus far suggest that employers are cur-
rently amenable to self-directed change. The time is ripe for proposals. What 
follows are initial suggestions for how employers might rethink their contracting 
practices and disciplinary protocols to achieve more just results when dealing 
with harassment allegations. 
To begin, employers should keep doing what they have begun doing in light 
of #MeToo: terminating or otherwise holding harassers accountable, even if it 
means unseating an iconic or revered person and even if there is a financial cost 
to doing so. There is also much that employers can do proactively with respect 
to their contracts with top-level employees. Employment agreements that confer 
job security should define “cause to terminate” to include conduct reasonably 
likely in itself, or in tandem with further comparable behavior, to violate antidis-
crimination laws.66 To be sure, top-level employees will push to limit employer 
discretion and foreclose the possibility of termination for isolated or seemingly 
 
65. On the problem of confidentiality and settlement practices in connection with #MeToo, see 
Ian Ayres, Targeting Repeat Offender NDAs, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 76 (2018) (arguing for a 
middle-ground approach to enforceability of nondisclosure provisions in sexual harassment 
settlement agreements that would respect victims’ and perpetrators’ preference for private 
resolution but ensure public access to information about the dispute in the event that the per-
petrator re-offends). 
66. This would disrupt the current incentive scheme by giving employers more flexibility to ter-
minate high-level employees for sexual harassment despite uncertainty as to whether the per-
petrator’s behavior would ultimately satisfy the “severe or pervasive” standard. 
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trivial misconduct, and many have the bargaining power to insist on such terms. 
But a candidate’s resistance to a provision specifically invoking compliance with 
antidiscrimination laws is a signal that companies should heed. In short, em-
ployers should not agree to contract terms that have the effect of insulating high-
level employees from the consequences of sexual harassment or of sanctioning 
repeat offenses. Provisions like those allegedly contained in Harvey Weinstein’s 
contract should become a thing of the past, and any that exist should be deemed 
voidable in contravention of public policy.67 
Employers should also develop counterincentives to sexual harassment. Ex-
ecutives and high-level managers are typically rewarded based upon stock per-
formance and other financial benchmarks. Employers might consider rewarding 
these employees on such bases as the promotion of women and minorities, ef-
forts to equalize pay, and reductions in Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission filings.68 
For all other employees, who have no contract protections and no bargaining 
power, employers should adopt a proportionate discipline protocol. The union 
grievance process provides a template. The evaluation of whether an employer 
terminated an employee for just cause for grievance purposes commonly in-
volves a seven-part test that focuses on three basic areas: the wrongdoing of the 
employee, the quality of the employer’s investigation, and the appropriateness 
 
67. Basic contract law provides that contract terms may be voided as a matter of public policy, 
despite the assent of both parties, where the law’s interest in enforcing the terms is out-
weighed by the public’s interest in non-enforcement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). Job-security provisions that protect harassers are not 
themselves unlawful, but to the extent they discourage employers from taking appropriate 
steps to prevent or correct harassment, their enforcement runs contrary to the public interest 
embodied in antidiscrimination laws. This theory has already been adopted by courts in the 
context of sexual harassment settlement agreements that preclude victims from filing charges 
or cooperating with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See EEOC v. 
Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 744-45 (1st Cir. 1996) (finding that enforcement of such provi-
sions would unduly hamper the EEOC’s ability to investigate and curtail harassment in vin-
dication of the public interest, and that such concerns outweighed any value served by such 
provisions in enabling private dispute settlement). 
68. Cf. Tristin Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of Dis-
parate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 146-48 (2003) (advancing a theory of 
disparate treatment law that links employer liability with the adoption of institutional safe-
guards to counteract implicit bias and stereotyping); Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 
8, at 2174-76 (advocating for litigation advantages to employers who meet gender desegrega-
tion benchmarks). 
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of the employer’s adverse action judged in the context of the particular work-
place.69 This inquiry can inform an employer’s determination of what consti-
tutes a proportionate response in the context of alleged sexual harassment. 
In the grievance context, arbitrators assess the employee’s wrongdoing in re-
lation to the employer’s rules.70 In the harassment context, employers should 
assess wrongdoing with an informed understanding of what sexual harassment 
is and why it is harmful. That is, they should ask whether the conduct was har-
assing to members of one sex and exploitive of workplace power dynamics. In 
evaluating the investigation, labor arbitrators ask whether the process was thor-
ough and fair and supported the employer’s conclusions.71 This evaluation in-
cludes determining such things as whether the employer interviewed all availa-
ble witnesses, engaged in appropriate follow up, provided the accused notice and 
an opportunity to be heard, and reached its ultimate decision objectively and de-
liberatively.72 Employers should bear in mind the same considerations when in-
vestigating harassment, mindful that the facts in dispute o�en concern the per-
petrator’s underlying intent and the victim’s genuine perception rather than 
whether the complained-of behavior actually occurred. Consistent with sexual 
harassment law, employers should ask whether the conduct was offensive to the 
victim and likely to be offensive to members of the victim’s sex.73 
Finally, in assessing the appropriateness of disciplinary action, arbitrators ask 
whether the punishment fit the crime. In sexual harassment matters, employers 
should not treat offensive statements, particularly isolated ones, the way they 
would treat recurring or unwelcome physical conduct. In such instances, correc-
tive action short of termination may provide a tailored and effective response. In 
addition to proportionality considerations, the inquiry invites self-examination 
on the employer’s part. In the grievance context, arbitrators take account of mit-
igating circumstances, including employer practices and whether it may have 
condoned or contributed to the employee’s conduct.74 This is not to suggest that 
known perpetrators should escape punishment, but rather that organizations 
must be careful not to scapegoat individual actors at the expense of broader cor-
 
69. Known commonly as the “seven tests,” the questions are attributed to Arbitrator Carroll 
Daugherty’s decision in Enterprise Wire Co., 46 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 359 (1966) (Daugherty, 
Arb.). See SEVEN TESTS, supra note 62, at 27-28.  
70. Id. at 11-12. 
71. Id. at 265. 
72. See SEVEN TESTS, supra note 62, at 185-214, 265-74. 
73. Harris v. Forkli� Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993). 
74. SEVEN TESTS, supra note 62, at 463-64. 
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rective action. As Schultz’s work has shown, sexual harassment flourishes along-
side other forms of gender inequality.75 Employers should not ask merely 
whether the employee’s conduct merited a particular response, but whether their 
own conduct deserves censure. What has the employer done to advance 
women’s careers, improve their working conditions, create cultures of inclusion, 
and ensure equal opportunity? Such questions are far more important than fer-
reting out sexual conduct by low-level employees, an endeavor that can seem like 
an easy solution but in reality can divert attention away from institutional re-
sponsibility.76 Systemic changes within organizations can have broader and 
more far-reaching impact in achieving gender equality than one-off punish-
ments of low-level harassers. Employers should view the quest to end harass-
ment not as a witch hunt, but as a process of institutional self-reflection. 
conclusion 
The #MeToo movement has exposed outrageous, even criminal, conduct by 
the masters of the workplace, revealing not just a tendency to odious behavior at 
the top of organizational hierarchies, but an extreme power imbalance in the 
workplace. Victims’ accounts arising out of the #MeToo movement reveal a 
world in which high-level decision makers wield unrestricted control over em-
ployees. Meanwhile, the organizations in which they work have looked away, 
even in situations of the most egregious abuse. 
Amazingly, this state of affairs is changing. Women are speaking out; and 
just as importantly, they are being believed. At this momentous time, it may 
seem insensitive or even dangerous to ask about what happens to the accused. 
But in the end, harassers’ rights are also workers’ rights. Organizational struc-
tures that allow individual decision makers free reign to mete out the harshest 
forms of discipline are the same ones that enable harassers to leverage sexual 
harassment as means of asserting control over dependent workers. Achieving a 
calibrated organizational response to sexual harassment allegations may ulti-
mately better serve the broader goals of the movement. Why not make the most 
of #MeToo—for women and for all vulnerable workers? 
 
 
 
75. Schultz, Reconceptualizing, supra note 8. 
76. On the limits and dangers of employer efforts to address sexual harassment through penaliz-
ing individual actors, see Anne Lawton, The Bad Apple Theory in Sexual Harassment Law, 13 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 817, 836-37; (2005); Schultz, Sanitized Workplace, supra note 8, at 2103-
19. 
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